A non-custodial bitcoin mixer that relies on a centralized coordinator has received criticism for not blocking mixes of bitcoin tied to North Korea, specifically the country’s alleged $387.5 million hack of crypto exchange Bitget in September. According to an X post by the pseudonymous Kruw, who operates as a so-called CoinJoin coordinator, users of his service accounted for 1.6% of Bitcoin’s blockspace usage over the previous 24 hours, up from the 1.1% he reported in August.
However, blockchain investigator ZachXBT pointed out that now seems like a bad time to celebrate this increased adoption. “Posting this while fully knowing your largest ‘user’ is currently Lazarus Group laundering hundreds of millions from exploits? Interesting,” ZachXBT wrote in reply. Lazarus Group is a North Korean state-sponsored hacking group that the U.S. Treasury Department sanctioned in 2019.
ZachXBT’s post quoted a thread from blockchain analytics firm Arkham, which said 2,266.68 bitcoin (about $161 million) had left wallets labeled as belonging to the Bitget hacker over the previous 11 days, mostly into mixers and CoinJoin addresses. Of that total, Arkham says 2,065.43 bitcoin went directly into WabiSabi CoinJoin rounds, and another 108.33 bitcoin entered CoinJoin through new addresses. WabiSabi is the specific CoinJoin protocol used by bitcoin software wallet Wasabi Wallet.
Arkham did not name a specific coordinator, but Kruw’s WabiSabi CoinJoin coordinator is by far the dominant option for WabiSabi CoinJoin users. From November 6th through the time of Arkham’s thread, Kruw’s coordinator processed 99.9% of the WabiSabi CoinJoin volume across the coordinators tracked by the CoinJoin explorer Wabisator. If nearly all of the 2,065 bitcoin that Arkham traced went through Kruw, that would make the Bitget hacker the source of roughly 60% of the new bitcoin entering his coordinator over that period, according to Wabisator’s estimate of fresh, non-remixed inputs.
Kruw’s coordinator is also being used to launder proceeds from the $6.3 billion Binance hack, according to Elliptic co-founder Tom Robinson. Robinson said about $40 million of the stolen funds has gone through CoinJoins coordinated by Kruw’s service since November 1st, and that the coordinator accepted 4.8 bitcoin from two addresses on Elliptic’s public Binance hack blocklist on Tuesday morning.
Last year, a public alert from the U.S. Secret Service also described Kruw.io as “the most prolific” of the services that emerged to offer CoinJoin through the Wasabi protocol, adding that Lazarus had previously used it “to mix approximately $14.3 million in cryptocurrency stolen by the North Korean regime” and was laundering some proceeds of the $1.4 billion Bybit hack through it. The alert also warned, “It is a crime to operate a mixer with the knowledge that it is processing illicit funds.”
In August, after a thief behind a large-scale compromise of Bitcoin keys generated by Coldcard hardware wallets began mixing stolen bitcoin, blockchain investigator tanuki42 pointed out that the thief’s CoinJoin “was coordinated by @Kruwed’s entirely centralized coordinator server,” adding that “Kruw could at any time choose to help victims of thefts like this and exclude these coins, but instead he consistently chooses to do nothing.”
ZachXBT was blunter in the same thread. “Wish the next US administration takes your entire livelihood so you can rot away behind prison like the criminal you are,” he wrote.
THORChain, the cross-chain swap protocol that North Korea-linked hackers have repeatedly used to convert stolen funds into bitcoin, has faced similar criticism. After the Bitget hack, THORChain described itself as too decentralized to block individual swaps involving stolen funds, even though its node operators halted trading when THORChain itself was exploited for roughly $10 million earlier this year, which many view as a contradiction that points to the use of the common crypto industry tactic of decentralization theater. THORChain has once again played a central role in laundering the Binance proceeds, which North Korea has also run through more experimental methods such as launching their own memecoins.
A Futile Endeavor?
Of course, not everyone agrees that Kruw should be blocking some users. Responding to ZachXBT on Tuesday, longtime Bitcoin developer and researcher Peter Todd dismissed the criticism entirely. “Who cares? Would you bitch about people using Zcash if Lazarus was using it too? What about Lightning? Or indeed, encryption?” Todd wrote. “All anonymity is from k-anonymity sets. And those sets include criminals.”
Kristov Atlas, a security engineer at Monad whose past work includes Bitcoin privacy research, made a similar point. “How would one get crypto privacy from spying governments and also be useless for thieves?” he asked.
Kruw has not responded to ZachXBT’s latest post as of this writing. But during the August Coldcard dispute, he argued, “You can’t prove you’ve been robbed. The attacker and the legitimate owner share the same entropy.” He also quoted Bitcoin Improvement Proposal editor Mark “Murch” Erhardt, who had posted that it is hard to know whether someone claiming their bitcoin was stolen “didn’t just spend them,” and that “treating coins differently depending on their history undermines fungibility.”
In what he called his statement on the matter, posted in a Stacker News thread, Kruw argued that censorship would be futile anyway. “Bitcoin has many overlapping privacy protocols. If someone is not granted permission to use one strategy, they will fall back to the next, then loop back into the first,” he wrote. “Any censorship attempt can only delay the movement of coins, not direct them somewhere else.”
Choosing Not to Censor
The broader takeaway here may be that more decentralized privacy tech is needed for Bitcoin, so that “can’t censor” replaces “chooses not to censor.” Due to how CoinJoins are coordinated by Kruw today, the reality is that he could decide to block funds originating from specific addresses, including those that have been tied to North Korea.
Of course, acting anonymously could have also been an option, as the operators of another CoinJoin coordinator, Ashigaru Whirlpool, have done. Kruw, on the other hand, has done little to stay anonymous, publicly speaking at multiple Bitcoin conferences.
That is a similar position to the one the developers behind Samourai Wallet were in when they ran its Whirlpool coordinator. Both of Samourai’s co-founders pleaded guilty to conspiring to operate an unlicensed money transmitting business tied to their operation of the Whirlpool coordinator and are now in prison. That said, there are some differences between how the Samourai developers ran their operation. For example, Samourai collected fees on its mixing service, while Kruw does not charge a coordination fee. However, he does keep small leftover amounts from rounds, which Wabisator estimates have totaled about 0.347 bitcoin (roughly $22,000) this year.
Notably, zkSNACKs, the company behind the WabiSabi technology Kruw uses, began blacklisting certain coins from its own coordinator in 2022 before eventually shutting the coordinator down in June 2024 amid the U.S. crackdown on Samourai.